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Using the database of demining accidents
Andy Smith, 2002 (Published in the JMU Journal of Mine Action)
Note: the database has been further enhanced and maintained since
this article was written.
The author has maintained a database of demining accidents for four
years. It contains records of many of the explosive accidents that
deminers suffer while going about their work. This article explains the
uses and limitations of the database and the software developed to
contain it.
I first published a database of accidents in Humanitarian Demining in
1998. In my experience, it was unique because it attempted to contain
the source material as well as the conventional “spreadsheet” style
summaries that characterise most databases. There have been several
releases on CD since 1998 and the latest was recently completed with
backing from UNMAS/GICHD. It was originally called the “Database of
Demining Incident Victims” (DDIV). At GICHD’s request, the latest
version has been renamed the “Database of Demining AccidentS”
(DDAS).
Original accident reports (edited for anonymity) are included when
possible. These may include photographs and usually include some
medical details about the victim’s injuries and treatment.
The 1999 edition of the DDIV contained details of 319 victims. The
current release contains an additional 160 but also many extensions to
old entries – such as medical reports and interviews concerning the
ongoing situation of victims. Some of the additional data records
accidents that happened some time ago. For example, there is now
some data about accidents in the British sector of Kuwait after the Gulf
war (none for other sectors).

Principal uses
It has been argued that the database provides a stick with which to beat
the humanitarian demining industry. While it could not be used to target
an individual or demining group, it could be used to criticise… But only if
you subscribe to the belief that people only learn through pain. It is
perfectly possible to use the lessons that can be derived in a positive
way, as described below.
1) Research
By providing “snapshots” of activities surrounding accidents, the
database can be used as an introduction to how demining is actually
carried out. This is often at variance with published SOPs and recent,
well detailed records show this clearly. Researchers developing new

equipment have used
it, and I recommend
its use when
preparing Technical
Advisors for field
deployment. This
might be especially
useful when a TA has
experience in one
area and is being sent
to another.
Apart from my own
papers, research
papers based on the
database have been
presented by Colonel
Alistair McAslan (ex-GICHD, now Director, Cranfield Mine Action) and Dr
Vernon Joynt (ex-MECHEM, now CSIR in South Africa ).
2) Training aid
As a training aid, real events can be used to show the importance of a
whole range of demining rules. These include using adequate area
marking, appropriate tools and detectors, cautious excavation, Quality
Control checks, blast visors, etc. It also provides salutary lessons over
the need for good training, appropriate field control, open management,
appropriate medical and communications equipment, etc. With real
examples, these issues cease to be entirely a “matter of opinion”.
Several demining NGOs have asked for the medical details in the
database for use when training their field medics.
3) Reference
The database proved invaluable during the revision of some parts of the
International Standards (IMAS) because the range of opinion was very broad and
based on heartfelt individual experience. The ability to refer to a broad overview
derived from global experience was useful, especially when the protagonists held
positions of authority and had made previous decisions based on incomplete
knowledge.
In this context, reference to the database established the prevalence of severe
hand-injury and showed which mines and demining activities posed the greatest
threat. It also showed that over-protection with ineffective PPE extras was neither
desirable nor necessary.

4) Demythologising
Demining engenders myths of danger, heroism and the “black art”. The

database explodes many of the myths – and shows how simple
demining actually is. It also shows how multilayered management
remote from the actual work can introduce new dangers by imposing
their ignorance.
The most obvious myth that the database exposes in that deminers lie

prone
when

excavating mines. Even in the few places where the SOPs demand it,
lying prone is so rare that it is certainly the exception rather than the rule.
5) Identifying causes

Perhaps most significant, the evidence clearly indicates that deminer
error is an infrequent cause of an accident, and that failures in the
control chain are far more common. When seeking to reduce the number
of accidents and/or the severity of resulting injury, understanding why
accidents occur is essential. When the person studying the database is a
contributory cause, that can be a deeply uncomfortable lesson.
The picture on the right shows an accident report opened inside the
database.
6) Archive

It is never possible to know what information will be needed in the
future. The database provides an archive to ensure that data is
preserved. For example, with the closure of the Kosovo MACC, their
accident investigations would be very hard to access if they were
not included in the DDAS. Also, a dataset of accidents in
Mozambique was recently returned to the MAC in Mozambique ,
where the original records had been lost. And in Cambodia , most of
the records that have survived are held in Khmer, so the DDAS
provides an English language translation for those wanting to learn
from past accidents.
The database is a useful source of information for managers and a very relevant training
tool for field use. Examples can be found to support safety requirements that deminers may
think unnecessary, and the reports themselves can be used to promote best practice in
accident investigations. The standard of investigation varies as much as the experience of
those carrying them out, and frequently an opportunity to learn from mistakes can be
obscured or lost in the reporting procedure.

Acceptance and rejection

While some demining NGOs requested copies very early on and
have issued the database to field groups as a resource, other
famous groups have failed to cooperate with data acquisition and
refused to accept the most compelling inferences that can be drawn
from the data amassed about their own accidents.
Because some players in the industry have been less than honest in
their reporting and less than open in sharing experience, the DDAS
cannot be presented as “complete”. I think that there are about 65%
of the accidents since 1996 in the database, but I cannot be sure.
With records of close to 500 victims, it includes complete data for
some countries in some years, Mozambique , Kosovo , Bosnia ,
Angola , Cambodia and Afghanistan are examples. The data made
available for Kurdish Iraq is sporadic and was summarised by UNDP
before being supplied. Data from the Kuwait clean-up after the Gulf
War is only just becoming available so the data sometimes stretches
back in time. Interestingly, the patterns that emerge in countries
where all data is available do not differ significantly from patterns
based on incomplete data, so it seems that the inferences can be
generally applied. Certainly, until a more complete dataset is
compiled, there is no reason not to use the best evidence we have
while working to extend it.
In some cases, commercial and political interests have led to data
being withheld. To cite a commercial example, it took me more than
four years to get copies of the written reports surrounding accidents
during the trials of a mechanical demining system in Mozambique .
Those records include well detailed charts of the staggering
percentage of mines that were not detonated and were left damaged
by the machines, which may explain the protracted secrecy.
An example of “political” interests leading to secrecy is the fatal
accident involving a roller system mounted on a tank outside Kabul
in the early 1990s. I presume that it is a fear of their own mistakes
being made public that has led the UK office of the famous NGO
involved to be uncooperative. They began by insisting that they did
not keep records of accidents. In 1997, they corrected this and said
that all their accident records were hard to find. Two years later they
promised that data on all their accidents would be provided if I gave
them the details of which of their accidents I already knew about. I
did that, but after a further 18 months they have failed to provide
access to records of a single accident. Fortunately the field officers
of that particular NGO are less fearful of the truth and (outside
Afghanistan ) have always provided all the records in their
possession when I have gone to knock on their doors.
It is only fair to contrast the failures with the successes. Some MACs
and NGOs have made their incident investigations readily available.
The Kosovo MACC was especially helpful. It made the most
thorough investigations on record, provided them quickly and then
carried out follow-up inquiries over the health of the victims.

So, if the DDAS is less than perfect because it does not contain all
of the records it could, that problem will only be addressed when
some major players in the industry smarten up their act.

New data, new conclusions?
I have previously published papers on the conclusions I have drawn
about accidents and their causes. The JMU Journal of Mine Action ,
Issue 4.2, Summer 2000, carries an article entitled “The facts on
protection needs in humanitarian demining” which I recommend you
read – http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/index/past.htm
The increased number of database entries have very little effect on
my previous conclusions. But the incompleteness of the data means
that any statistical analysis based on it must always be made with
informed caution.
Additional records change the ratio between UXO and mine
accidents in HD significantly. But that ratio was never representative
because traditional EOD tasks are often carried out by serving
military who do not carry out independent investigations and do not
make their own accident records available.
The rich data stream from the Balkans has changed the balance of
“threat” mines in HD, but not significantly.
Defining the “threat” mines as those most frequently involved in
accidents, the current list (April 2002) reads:
Demining accidents in the
DDAS
AP blast
AP B/frag
Fuze
AP Frag
AT
Ordnance
Submunition
Other/unknown

74%
8%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
3%

This is interesting, but not much help unless you put it alongside the
results of those accidents. For example, the mines/devices involved
in accidents where deaths occurred were:
Deaths in demining accidents
AP blast
AP B/frag

22%
33%

Fuze
AP Frag
AT
Ordnance
Submunition
Other/unknown

0%
3%
8%
18%
3%
12%

The AP blast and AP bounding-fragmentation situation is reversed
with many more deaths from bounding-fragmentation mines than
from AP blast mines. You should also notice that Ordnance, which
only features in 2% of all accidents, causes a significant proportion
of fatalities.
These figures are also misleading – because most of AP bounding
fragmentation mine incidents occur in the Balkans with a mine that
is not a problem in most of the rest of the world (the PROM-1). Also,
most of the AP blast mine incidents involve the PMN, which does
not occur at all in recorded accidents in the Balkans. It should also
be noted that the majority of the ordnance deaths occurred in Kuwait
during the post Gulf-war clean up and before any International
safety standards for Humanitarian Demining existed.
To make an analysis of injury significant I have had to draw a
distinction between “severe” injuries and “minor” injuries. I define the
difference as:
Minor: a minor injury is one that does not
require surgical intervention and does not
result in long-term disability.
Severe: a severe injury is one that results in
long-term disability or requires surgical
intervention.
This is a fairly crude distinction but I have found it useful.
Not every accident involved severe injury. Of those that did, the
devices involved were:
Severe injuries in demining
accidents
AP blast
AP B/frag
Fuze
AP Frag
AT
Ordnance
3%
Submunition
1%
Other/unknown
1%

70%
14%
1%
4%
6%

These include deaths – which I have assumed always involved

severe injuries.
So you can see that AP blast mines cause by far the most severe
injuries.
What was the victim doing at the time?
Activity during AP blast
accidents
Excavation
46.5%
Demolition
1%
Detection
2%
Handling
5.5%
Stepping on Missed
mine
29%
Survey
6%
Vegetation removal
3%
Victim inattention
7%

The most common activity at the time of a blast mine accident is
excavating a suspicious area. This may have been found using a
metal detector or a dog, exposed by a machine or may have been a
part of wide area excavation – during which the whole surface of the
soil is removed in suspicious areas where other methods cannot be
used.
In an excavation accident, the two most common severe injuries are
to the eyes and the hands/arms. The injuries may be the loss of an
eye, fingers, hand or arm – or may be the loss of function in it – so
leading to permanent disability.
Common injuries when
excavating AP blast mines
(as a % of all excavation accidents)
Loss of eye or eyes
Severe eye
Amp fingers
Amp Hand
Amp Arm
Severe arm
Severe shoulder
Severe hand

6.7%
22.7%
11.5%
2.2%
4.1%
6.3%
1.9%
16.4%

In about 30% of all excavation accidents with AP blast mines – a
severe eye injury occurs.

In about 42% of all excavation accidents with AP blast mines – a
severe injury to a hand or arm occurs.
Severe chest injury occurred in only 3.5% of recorded excavation
accidents – and in more than half of those the injury was caused by
parts of the handtool. Severe chest injury is rare – surprisingly, this
is true whether or not the victim was wearing body armour. Many
deminers without body armour get away with detonating an AP blast
mine with no body injuries at all. While I personally like to wear
frontal body armour, the database does not provide compelling
evidence of its value in an AP mine blast. Blast visors in good
condition, and purpose designed demining handtools, do make a
noticeable difference.

Causes of the injuries
Severe eye injury results from:
1) The issue of inappropriate eye protection – such as
the industrial safety spectacles that are still widely used;
2) The issue of visors that cannot be seen through.
3) The use of visors that are not down at the time of
detonation.
4) The use of old, hard visors that shatter on blast
impact.
Severe hand and arm injury results from:
1) The use of a short tool meaning that the hand is within
30cm of the mine when it detonates.
2) The use of an inappropriate digging method so that
the hand is above the mine when it detonates.
3) The use of a tool that shatters on detonation and the
parts inflict other injuries.
Hand injury also results from digging incautiously or by devices that
are particularly sensitive, but if the device is an AP blast mine, the
detonation does not generally cause severe injury unless one or
more of the above are also true.
So perhaps you will understand why my own particular technology
interests in demining have been visors, handtools, appropriate PPE
and training. The database has helped me to identify the problems,
and sometimes to begin to answer them.

The future of the accident database
Until recently the CD database was unsupported by any
organisation or donor. My last update of the database was funded
through GICHD with UNMAS approval. It is available on request [no
longer available] from GICHD as a self-installing CD for use on
computers with Windows 95 (or later) and Office 97 professional (or
later). Please contact GICHD if you would like a copy.
I believe that it should be extended with another dataset listing
missed-mine incidents where the device was “found” after clearance
was finished. These events are sometimes investigated, but the
reports are often jealously guarded. Such a dataset would allow
some objective comparison of the effectiveness of methods (and
groups). The database could also be extended to include datasets
of civilian injury in uncleared areas – and you will find an example of
this on the distribution CD.
But, at the time of writing, the future of the database is uncertain.
But if you have details of any demining accidents, please send them
to me by email.
The picture below shows a deminer gambling with his fingers
in Angola.
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